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Abstract Clowns seem suspect when it comes to respect.
The combination of clowning and people with dementia
may seem especially suspicious. In this argument, I take
potential concerns about clowning in dementia care as an
opportunity to explore the meaning of a respectful
approach of people with dementia. Our word ‘respect’ is
derived from the Latin respicio¯, meaning ‘looking back’ or
‘seeing again’, as well as ‘looking after’ or ‘having regard’
for someone or something. I build upon this double
meaning of respicio¯ by examining how simultaneously we
look to and after people with dementia. I do so empirically
by studying how miMakkus clowns in their practice learn
to look with new eyes to people and things around them. I
call this clown’s view and differentiate it from the pre-
dominant way of observing people in dementia care. I
argue that respicio¯ comes in two guises, each of which
merges specific forms of looking to and looking after the
other. By making conventional, solidified ways of seeing
the other fluid again, clowns remind us of the value that
comes with a veiled way of paying respect to people with
dementia.
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Sense perception
Respicere
1. Present active infinitive of respicio¯
Respicio¯
From re- (‘‘back; again’’) ? specio¯ (‘‘observe, look at’’).
1. I look behind, look back at or upon, look to, look
around.
2. I have regard for, consider; respect.
Our seeing is not pure visual perception. Our seeing
implies intentions and meanings and as such it is an
expression of our lived relation to our environment.
…Ways of seeing are ways of being… : how as
observing beings do we relate to our environment and
to each other? (Kamphof 2012: 13)
Introduction
People often react slightly amazed when I tell them about
my research on miMakkus, a special method of clowning
for people living with an advanced stage of dementia. Most
of us are likely to associate clowns with children rather
than the elderly, let alone seniors with dementia. The
colorful character of the clown contrasts sharply with the
sterile image of nursing home care. A clown’s expressive
vibrancy epitomizes vitality, and this seems at odds with
the routines of everyday life in the psycho-geriatric ward
(PG). Commenting on the two worlds, one expert said that
‘‘the paradox could hardly be greater.’’1
The culture of dementia care is undergoing changes,
however (Griffin 2012). Today’s vision of quality care
stresses at least three elements: it is person-centered, it& Ruud Hendriks
hendriks@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, Maastricht University, PO Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
1 Rob Spijkers is a psychologist (Orbis, Sittard, The Netherlands)
who has worked in psycho-geriatric care for 14 years. Interview:
Maastricht, 16 June 2009.
123
Med Health Care and Philos
DOI 10.1007/s11019-016-9734-1
engages people in meaningful activities, and it promotes
their connection with the outside world (Kitwood and
Benson 2004). More or less creative day activities therefore
satisfy a major need. Professional artists, too, increasingly
find their way to the PG. Where conventional communi-
cation fails, art might well succeed in reaching the person
with dementia (de Medeiros and Basting 2013).
Similar expectations about the power of art apply to the
specialized forms of clowning that in the past decade
emerged in intramural care for seniors (e.g. Raviv 2013;
Symons 2012). Elder-clowning evolved in the wake of
other creative approaches aimed at supporting vulnerable
seniors, improving their quality of life, and countering the
threat of loss of identity (Basting 2009; Lee and Adams
2011; Warren 2008).
The goal of miMakkus is to make contact with people
who are not (any longer) capable of communication in the
usual, cognitive manner. The so-called ‘miMakker’ (‘my
pal’) is not an entertainer who rehearses an act, performs a
trick, or tries to make people laugh. The miMakker is
concerned with the emotional wellbeing of residents, their
experience of ‘‘joy and sorrow’’ (www.mimakkus.nl). A
miMakker focuses on the individual and tries to go along in
how this person experiences a situation through improvis-
ing in a subdued, non-theatrical way in response to what
takes place in the here and now. She thereby makes contact
beyond ordinary language and meanings.
‘‘How special,’’ as many people reacted when I told
them about miMakkus. ‘‘Not for me,’’ as others whispered
who saw it as a matter of little respect to send a clown to
people who cannot rationally assent or object to it. It
involves vulnerable patients, they reasoned, who can be
easily misled.2
Respect is a thorny issue in public debates on care for
people with dementia. One context in which the notion of
respect appears is that of living wills and their status. This
pertains to respecting the will of the person who when still
capable of rational decisions indicated a desire for not
wanting to live any longer in the event their suffering from
dementia becomes unbearable. The suffering feared is
closely interconnected with the fear for the loss of personal
identity and human dignity and, after having fallen prey to
dementia, for becoming fully dependent on others.
Discussions on respect for people with dementia will
soon center on big notions such as autonomy, identity, and
dignity.3 In contrast, I am more concerned with the ways in
which respect takes shape in small, everyday interactions
with residents of nursing homes. The sense of discomfort
sometimes prompted by miMakkus suggests, however, that
weightier interests are at play. I consider this discomfort as
a welcome occasion for further reflection on respectful
dealing with people with dementia.
Respect comes from the Latin respicio¯—the verb being
respicere—which means ‘looking back’ or ‘looking again,’
in addition to ‘looking after,’ ‘being concerned with’ or
‘caring for something or someone.’ In my argument I
capitalize on this double meaning of respicio¯ by exploring
how we look to and look after people with dementia. I do
so empirically, by investigating how the miMakker learns
to see with other eyes (‘clown’s view’) and how this differs
from common ways of looking at or dealing with people
with dementia in care. The question of how clown’s view
respects the other is center-stage.
In the context of this research project I enrolled in the
special training course for miMakkus clowns. This training,
which I successfully completed in March 2009, comprised
22 days of instruction, field visits and an internship tra-
jectory. Based on participant observations I made field
notes. During a second round of ethnographic fieldwork I
followed five miMakkers at work for a week (July 2010;
January 2011; February–March 2011; May–July 2011).
Finally, I observed four miMakkers-in-training (Novem-
ber–December 2011) during one of their hands-on
internships.4
In my argument below I briefly discuss the background
of the discomfort sometimes triggered by clowns. I follow
one miMakker in her practice to understand the stakes and
power of clowning. I address several contentious aspects of
clowning to trace back the difference in valuation to the
two forms of respicio¯ distinguishable in dementia care.
Finally, in my conclusion I draw up the balance regarding
the specific contribution of ‘clown’s view’ to a respectful
treatment of people with dementia.
Disruption as counterbalance
Who plays the clown calls suspicion on herself when it
comes to respect. With her red nose, which provides her
with an alibi ‘‘to look at the world differently,’’5 the
2 On ethical dilemmas around truth and deception in care for people
with dementia, see Schermer (2007).
3 See for instance Hertogh et al. (2007) for a contribution to the
debate on the status of living wills of people with dementia in which
respect for autonomy is central. This debate builds on the work of
Dworkin (1993), Dresser (1995), Jaworska (1999), Koppelman
(2002), and others.
4 My observations were recorded within the framework of the project
Beyond autonomy and language (The Netherlands Organisation for
Health Research and Development, program Disability Studies in
Nederland. See: www.zonmw.nl/en/). Prior to the project I received
permission from all psycho-geriatric care facilities involved, as well
as from the miMakkus Foundation in Eindhoven, the Netherlands,
miMakkus instructors, and the (student and certified) miMakkers
involved.
5 Arno Huibers, Lesson 3, Body as tool, Eindhoven 2 April 2008.
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miMakker situates herself in a cultural tradition harking
back to the fool—a figure in the margins of authority who
without fear of being of punished for it could mock the
pretention of power. As other, the forerunners of modern
clowns functioned as critical counterpart of the established
order and it was their role ‘‘to re-establish an equilibrium in
the face of power, which is immobile and static’’ (Robb
2007: 6).
Simonds and Warren (2004) have demonstrated how
precisely a modern hospital will benefit from a figure who
enjoys special protection to disrupt the order. Once a relation
of trust has been forged, hospital clowns are allowed to do
anything in response to patients and staff. ‘‘They push the
limits. In so doing, they shake up the hierarchy and protocols
and indirectly serve the healing process’’ (64). The power of
the clown resides in a playful reversal of roles. Regardless of
their knowledge and authority, the clown exposes the care-
provider as victim. Patients—such as children who have to
undergo heavy treatment—deserve her respect. With the
clown as ally these patients are allowed to be in charge, if
only for a moment.
As a distant descendant of the fool, the miMakker, too,
is free to disrupt the prevailing morality or to cross
boundaries. Take Fien, the clown character of Tessa
Brouwer (a pseudonym) and one of over two hundred
miMakkers who successfully completed their training.6 A
miMakker puts much of herself into her clown, which is
why these clowns differ as much in character as in
appearance. Fien can be characterized as a French artiste,
the Edith Piaf type. As such she represents many shades,
but as no other Fien embodies the rebellious side of clowns.
Fien is keen on fooling authority figures. An unsuspecting
care-provider who had to sneeze loudly, for example,
immediately faced the echo of a strongly exaggerated
clown’s sneeze. Commonly, such spontaneous reactions are
not meant to criticize care-providers—the clown is primarily
geared to residents: with a secretive look towards them Fien
still tried to bury her sneeze in the net curtains. There cer-
tainly are good reasons to hold the mirror up to care-provi-
ders every now and then, but the miMakker primarily aims to
create a sense of togetherness with the resident.
Clowning contested
A clown can take the liberty to do things that others cannot.
The clowning approach thus turns prevailing power rela-
tions upside down, but also tampers with convictions of
what is ‘good’ in care for people with dementia. Take Fien,
whose loose shoelaces are a harbinger of the trouble she
constantly gets mixed up in. A conscious strategy: the
clown’s clumsiness has an irresistible appeal for those who
commonly find themselves in a vulnerable position and
who are thus offered a chance to take care of her (cf.
Hendriks 2012). A first field note:
Saint Anna, 22 February 2011, 10.05 h
‘‘Watch out! Or you fall down!,’’ as the residents
warn Fien to be cautious. Fien hesitates. ‘‘Just walk
on,’’ as the women concernedly say to her. ‘‘Walk
carefully, as you always do.’’ ‘‘Like this?,’’ Fien asks.
‘‘Yes, go ahead!’’
Of course she does fall down, stretched out to the floor.
Although some will find it inappropriate for a grown-up
woman with a clown’s nose to be mopping the floor, most
skeptics will accept its reality. As long as their mom or dad
just sit there quietly, and do not have to do anything… But
once Fien finds herself stretched out on the floor other
forces come into play.
Saint Anna, 22 February 2011, 10.35 h
Mrs. De Groot motions Fien, who goes to her by
crawling across the floor. Fien finds a stool to sit on,
but it still needs to be polished: she is quite a ‘‘clean
person,’’ Fien says. Her gaze falls onto the crust of
bread lying on the floor. She picks it up and shows
her find to Mrs. De Groot, who grabs the crust and
puts it into her mouth. A tiny bit remains in her hand
and Fien puts it into her mouth without a blush.
Carefully chewing on it she tastes it. A moment later
they are chewing together, heartily. In the meantime a
conversation develops between them that consists of
soft sounds accompanied by changing facial expres-
sions. They completely understand each other, so
their body language reveals, even if ‘oops’ and ‘wow’
are the only words I can make out.
The discomfort potentially triggered by this situation has
first of all a personal dimension. Close relatives of
dementia patients often do their utmost to affirm the
identity of one who can no longer do so himself by holding
onto his earlier values, preferences, and habits. Kitwood
(1997: 20): ‘‘The more that is known about any individ-
ual’s interests, tastes and life history, the more likely it is
that this need will be met.’’7 Unlike relatives, friends, and
6 For privacy reasons I anonymized names of the miMakker clown-
characters and practitioners, residents, and institutions, but not the
names of miMakkus instructors. Given the proportion of women to
men (of about 9–1) I prefer to use the feminine to refer to miMakkus
clowns; where my own experiences are concerned, I use he/his/him.
7 Kitwood (1990) has pointed to the role of positive, social-
psychological environmental factors—such as offering solace or a
sense of comfort, confirming the reality of the other—that contribute
to sustaining people’s sense of who they are. Negative factors are, for
instance, exclusion, stigmatization, and denial of how someone
experiences reality. According to this holistic vision on dementia,
people who because of their vulnerable condition are frequently
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care-providers, Fien as quasi-naı¨ve outsider lacks such
shared history with the resident. Although before visiting a
home miMakkers inform themselves about possible clini-
cal or social details, and, depending on the frequency of
visits, get to know ‘their’ residents over time, such infor-
mation should not be allowed to get in the way of their
clown’s play. MiMakkus training devotes much attention
to techniques (more on this later) to look at the other with
new eyes time and again.
It is a question, however, whether close relatives of Mrs.
De Groot can still see the person she was in the one who
shares a crust of bread with Fien, and if she herself would
have wanted to. By focusing on the here and now the
personal history of the other threatens to vanish from
sight.8
Secondly, the clown’s nearsightedness leads to a tension
with the conventional outlook on humankind hidden in
views about and practices of good care. Arno Huijbers,
initiator and instructor of the miMakkus method, suggests
that in the early stages of dementia patients may find a hold
in references to the familiar reality, but that for people in
later stages it has a crippling effect when they are con-
stantly corrected because of their experience being at odds
with (our view of) reality. The clown precisely tries to
reach out to this last group. She wonders whether she can
go along in, and possibly add in an imaginative and playful
way to the other’s language and experience.9
But this can also be perceived as debasing. Should you
go along in the loss of decorum that, as some argue, occurs
in people with dementia? To prevent the other from sinking
even further, we commonly try to shelter him or her in the
order of meaningfulness as long as possible. All and
everything has its own place in it: people at the table, food
on the plate, dirt on the ground.10 Who like Fien deliber-
ately disturbs this order does not only ignore the kind of
person Mrs. De Groot was before she lost her language and
memory; potentially one also undermines the dignity of the
person the other still is.
Respicio¯ from overview
Ideas on what is ‘good’ in contact with people with
dementia, and how to evaluate the miMakker in this regard,
thus turn out to diverge strongly. To interpret this differ-
ence in assessment we need to go back to the origin of the
term ‘respect’: Those who elevate the notion of going
along in the vulnerable position of people with dementia to
the art of clowning have a way of looking that differs from
those who fear that people’s sense of dignity may thus be
adversely affected. This difference goes back to two guises
in which respicio¯ becomes manifest in dementia care,
which represent two traditions in the history of the Western
gaze. I derive them from a study by philosopher Ike
Kamphof, entitled Iedereen voyeur (Everyone a voyeur,
2012), in which she describes the birth of the modern
control-oriented gaze (overview, oversight, surveillance) as
well as an older form of ‘nearsightedness’ that still colors
our vision.
Kamphof starts off her history of the modern gaze with
the early Renaissance author Petrarch who, having climbed
to the top of Mont Ventoux, reported on the visible world at
his feet, but he was also—and this was a first—fully
‘‘aware’’ of the experience of having a (panoramic) over-
view (22). Many would follow in his footsteps, turning the
‘‘entire earth into a domain of observation’’ (23) and
mapping the unknown. Kamphof writes about a ‘‘newly
acquired inner footing’’ that offers the heirs of Petrarch ‘‘a
hold’’ (23). ‘‘From that perspective, they view themselves
as autonomous beings, separate from and partly placed
above nature’’ (23). In this way they acquire ‘‘knowledge
about the world’’ (23) and a certain preponderance
regarding what they look out upon from their lofty position.
Footnote 7 continued
confronted with their failure or incapacity would experience much
additional adverse impact of a negative social-psychological
environment.
8 I should specify here that to win support miMakkers increasingly
organize information meetings for relatives and others on the how and
why of the work they do. The miMakkus-clown instructor Titia
Brasse´ (Interview, Geleen, 10 April 2015) explains that the residents
she visits as a miMakker need a formal indication for this type of care,
to be specified in a care plan on which consensus is sought. She will
not ignore a resident without formal indication who is looking for
contact, Brasse´ says, but where possible one should also look for a
dialog with relatives.
9 Arno Huibers, Lesson 21, ‘Clown principles’, Eindhoven 19
November, 2009. By embracing ‘‘the imaginary as a means to
counteract barriers to communication such as residents’ incoherent or
nonsensical speech in the presence of reminiscence or delusion,’’ as
Kontos et al. (2015: 12) put it, the clown finds herself in the good
company of other art interventions aimed at helping people to sustain
a meaningful relation with their environment beyond cognition. For
example, Anne Basting (2009), in the TimeSlips project (http://www.
timeslips.org/) stresses the power of imagination; Gerry Glazner’s
Alzheimer’s Poetry project (http://www.alzpoetry.com/index.php/)
centers on the emotional force of poetry (Swinnen 2014).
10 Fien is perfectly aware that her performance exceeds many
boundaries, as evidenced by her remark that she is cleanliness itself.
Her idea of cleanliness reveals a deep seated cultural reflex, which has
been described by anthropologist Mary Douglas and which cannot be
ignored without cost: our inclination towards purity as line of defense
against external dangers in the form of dirt, disease, and contagion.
The increasing blurring of the boundaries of our existence seems to




The articulation of an objectified worldview and a modern
subject perceiving it as such go hand in hand.11
By appropriating the world as visual object, the
observing, understanding human being becomes a
subject. No longer is he a small element in a divine
creation, a toy of fate and nature. He is outside and
above what he understands by observing. The world
becomes his world. (23)
Given the omnipresence of this way of looking we are
hardly aware of it anymore. Modern patient care is no
longer conceivable without detailed observations and
‘‘scientific objectification’’ (28) that within the logic of
evidence-based care counts as decisive good.12 Statistical
data processing and schematic representation of observa-
tions on an aggregated level thereby mirror the ‘‘distance of
the spectator to his image’’ (39–40), which is characteristic
of this meanwhile conventional way of looking. But
observation also has an everyday dimension. The miMak-
ker regularly engages with her work as an observer as well.
This applies for instance during her training, when she
observes the practice of experienced colleagues, as well as
for the miMakker who observes and reports on the effect of
her own interventions.13
Overview as moral attitude
Through observation we learn to know the world in a
certain way. Our way of looking, however, is not only of
importance epistemologically, but also has normative
value. The double meaning of respicio¯ reminds us that our
relation to the world is expressed not only in how we look
to the world and ourselves, but also in how we look after
the world and each other—people with dementia in this
case.
The conventional modern perspective is ruled by dis-
tance (or detachment) in normative respects as well; it calls
for appropriate distance, both between individuals and vis-
a`-vis the world. In the wake of this modern way of looking,
respect primarily came to refer to the autonomy of the
subject. Translated to ‘good’ care for people with demen-
tia, all is geared maximally to underpin the ‘grand’ subject
position they once shared.
There are ample threats, however, in the form of loss of
language and memory and reduced awareness of reality.
Dworkin (1993), a prominent representative of this nor-
mative perspective, argued that people suffering from
advanced dementia ‘‘have no sense of a whole life, a past
joined to a future, that could be the object of any evaluation
or concern as a whole’’ (230). Precisely the competence of
these people to survey their life as an integrated totality
and use this as a basis for reasoning, as Dworkin claims, is
undermined by serious dementia. As a result, they have
‘‘no contemporary opinion about their own critical inter-
ests’’ (230).
Resisting biological destiny, this form of respect is
aimed at helping patients to retain their inner footing. The
threat of loss of control or overview must be compensated
by making life more ‘surveyable’. A respectful approach
contributes to memorizing and understanding, offers
knowledge and power by supporting the act of choosing.
Informed consent is the normative rule. If this is not pos-
sible anymore and we hold on to the consequent applica-
tion of the autonomy principle, in line with Dworkin’s
argument, the person’s earlier set of values—from before
dementia gained the upper hand—deserves our respect (cf.
Jaworska 1999: 108).
This conventional way of looking offers a moral com-
pass in dementia care, providing arguments against an
exclusive focus on the quality of the momentary experience
that we, playing the devil’s advocate, might suspect the
miMakker to have.14 Or, in Dworkin’s terms: who con-
centrates on fulfilling experiential interests will be more
inclined to lose sight of a person’s lasting values (or critical
interests)—that is, concerns about whether something will
fit in with a person’s course of life, with what he or she
always believed to be right (cf. Jaworska 1999: 108–109).
A conventional way of seeing and being fosters and
explains skepticism about the role of the clown, who in her
focus on the now-self of the resident would forget the then-
self (cf. Koppelman 2002).
This said, it is not as if the miMakker never doubts
whether she is right or would be insensitive as regards to
the inviting perspective of control. In how she looks after
or cares for the other, the clown also draws from this
11 Kamphof here relies on work by Heidegger (The Age of the
Worldview), Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception), and
Nietzsche (On the Use and Abuse of History for Life).
12 This also explains the dominance of calls for evidence-based
observational research in discussions on the value of art in health- and
dementia care (for critiques, see: de Medeiros and Basting 2013;
Oliver 2009; Raw et al. 2012). In line with the evidence-based
paradigm of medical and psychological disciplines, existing studies of
clowning in care for the elderly generally focus on the observed
effectiveness of what is called ‘humor and laughing therapy’ (e.g.
Spitzer 2011; Warren and Spitzer 2011). Moreover, the miMakkus
foundation itself also builds on the promise of observational (e.g.
video-based) research (cf. Wintels et al. 2014).
13 Cf. Stichting miMakkus (2015).
14 Such focus on the person in the here and now by the clown who
tries to be ‘‘fully in the present moment’’ (de Graan 2012: 69) can be
defended on philosophical grounds as well. Rebecca Dresser (1995), a
critic of Dworkin, claims that the psychological discontinuity on
account of dementia can be so large that the interests and preferences
of the earlier person do not constitute a good standard in care. She
argues for starting from the person in his/her current condition.
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repertoire of respicio¯, which considers the autonomous
subject as standard. During their training, miMakkers are
told to ‘‘always ask for permission,’’ for instance to sit with
someone—they need to deal respectfully with desires and
the privacy of residents. ‘‘Coercion is altogether wrong,’’ as
Jan Rauh (2013), one of the first miMakkus instructors,
claims in his personal notes: ‘‘When a resident does not
want any contact, we will respect this and go away’’ (34,
emphasis added).
Respicio¯ from receptiveness
Sometimes the desire of a resident and the question of how
to respect it leave little to guess. ‘‘Just you go and knock on
the next door!’’ I was told as Joop—my alter-ego as
miMakker—during one of my first internships. Others may
like it but I do not—this is how a clown may subtly be put
in his place. Commonly, however, life in the PG is less
transparent. Often it is hard to know what someone means
because ‘normal’ communication is hampered and resi-
dents may not be able anymore to look at the totality of
their own life. In the practice of care for people with severe
dementia, the form of respicio¯ that centers on the autono-
mous subject proves to be all but taken for granted.
This is not to say that this way of looking would (or
should) not play a role in care for people with dementia. It
does in fact, as normative ideal—we usually continue to
approach the other as autonomous subject as long as pos-
sible—and perhaps as shared reality as well. But as Kam-
phof (2012) writes, ‘overview’ and control also come at a
price because they cover an alternative way of seeing and
being (53). The modern role of the observer-at-a-distance
was preceded by another way of looking, which—dis-
creetly, ‘‘as substratum of our perception’’ (47)—co-con-
structs our relation to the world and the other. This other
form of looking and looking after—respicio¯—starts from
‘‘our receptiveness for that reality’’ (37).
In what follows I discuss this alternative way of looking
on the basis of Kamphof’s remarks on visual culture.15
Next, I apply it to the gaze of the miMakker (‘clown’s
view’) as developed in contact with residents. I will
extensively address how clown’s view emerges in actual
practice, before I finally elaborate the normative implica-
tions of a receptive way of looking for the encounter
between the miMakker and the resident.
Kamphof traces back the origin of this alternative way of
seeing and being to the dusty attics of art history, where
particularly religious images and artifacts seem to cross out
the prevailing view in art philosophy that there is a clear
dividing line between image and reality. In the visual culture
in which believers lovingly touch their icons and images—or
where, conversely, such images provoke anger—there is no
‘‘observer who keeps a distance’’; rather, looking includes
‘‘forms of direct sensory and emotional response’’ (42).
From a modern perspective such intense dealing with
images may seem archaic. And yet, many of us are also
easily ‘‘tempted’’ by images (42). An image of a person or
event may offer us—through its confusing similarity with
the original or by having been physically in touch with it—
a ‘‘magical’’ experience as well, one of ‘‘coming nearer to
otherness’’ (44). Looking makes the outside world resonate
within us. You do not experience a ‘‘deeply touching’’
movie as observer; rather, such movie ‘‘immerses you in
the reality presented’’ (45). Looking is something we do
with our entire body, as Kamphof writes with reference to
Sobchack: ‘‘Seeing is also touching, smelling, hearing and
feeling a body move through the space in front of us’’ (76).
The inner footing that gave the modern subject a sense
of autonomy and control is accompanied, according to this
alternative history of the gaze, by a physical footing of
seeing in the real world, and this we also find with the
clown. The ‘self’ depends on that world for sharpening the
senses. ‘‘A single matted color leaves our eyes blind’’ (47);
a lack of contrast puts out the senses.
Sometimes this overlooked foundation of our perception
briefly reveals itself. Kamphof indicates how modern
visual art commits ‘‘an attack on our gaze’’ that causes our
view of the world to vanish, and with it ‘‘the certainties on
which the self is founded’’ (48). The artwork knocks the
observer off his pedestal. ‘‘We lose our place as beholders
of a well-shaped and understood image. In a way we
become blind for the modern artwork’’ (48).
My point is not to make a case for visual art as such, but
for what it reminds us of—our half-forgotten power ‘‘to see
again, this time with other eyes, sensing new possibilities’’
(48). Art teaches us to distinguish new nuances in what first
seemed chaos or left us indifferent, and to let ourselves be
touched. In such a moment the ‘‘boundaries between self
and world’’ get blurred and for a moment we feel that we
owe our ability to ‘see’ to the ‘‘perceivability of the world’’
(49). On such moment it is ‘‘as if we received eyes only a
minute ago’’ (47), Kamphof writes with reference to Lyo-
tard. Momentarily the eye becomes ‘‘an organ for touch-
ing’’ while seeing is briefly ‘‘being touched’’ (49).
Clown’s view
A miMakker, I argue, embodies this often overlooked,
receptive form of respicio¯ as no one else. She is one who
looks in an engaged manner, by using her entire body:
15 Kamphof bases this alternative history of the gaze on Baudrillard
(Simulacra and Simulation), Frazer’s history of magic (The Golden
Bough), Freedberg (The Power of Images), Lyotard (The Inhuman),




becoming a miMakker can be understood, as I also argued
elsewhere, as acquiring a sensitive body that in ever greater
detail learns to distinguish between subtle signals and
differences in how the other is present in the world in an
attentive, physical and sensorial way (Hendriks 2012: 469).
Her sensitive clown’s body helps the miMakker to
attune to the other ‘‘like an antenna.’’16 ‘‘Fine-tuning’’ is a
matter of ‘‘searching for the other’s wavelength, wherever
that may be’’—not by observing the person with dementia
from a distance but by trying to ‘‘go along’’ in his emotion,
physical presence, sphere of attention, and experience. By
adapting to the rhythm of breathing and a slower tempo, for
instance, ‘‘you respect the resident.’’
As practice of mimesis (Taussig 1993), this clowning
technique escapes the contradiction of (mental) immersion
versus (strictly outer) imitation. By playing along, the
miMakker tries to incorporate the world of the other as a
way to approach the other’s experience. ‘‘I am not going to
copy or imitate someone,’’ as Jan Rauh teaches us, but:
Lesson 1 ‘Presence’, Eindhoven, 12 March 2008
JR: The moment that you [as resident] walk like this,
I as clown can join in; … I then take over that dis-
position. In this way you [as clown] can sense how it
could be for me [as resident], and next you may hook
up with that and perhaps we thus find something we
can share.17
Attunement is a challenge and calls for commitment; it
requires ‘‘courage’’ to let yourself be carried along by the
disorderly situation you and the resident may end up in.
Precisely by relinquishing all certainty, shared contact may
emerge—beyond the autonomous subject, ‘‘as if it happens
to you.’’
Such a moment of being together can potentially enrich
the life of residents, as I will argue below—for the
miMakker it is a vital gift. ‘‘Being open to outside stimuli’’
is at the core of who she is: Fien would never have become
the sensitive clown she is without the subtle shades that
residents taught her to see. By explicitly expressing her
acknowledgment to the resident, Tessa Brouwer always
recognizes what she owes to the other: the articulation of
her clown’s view.18
The clown must put in an effort, however, to acquire the
receptive habitus that allows the world to resonate in her. It
takes a lot of exercise to tap this sublayer of perception and
to learn to use it for making contact (Hendriks 2012:
469–70). A first step is to ‘‘empty’’ yourself. In our training
we were offered various tactics to ‘‘rid ourselves of
meaning,’’ as in an exercise in which we had to explore the
material space and things ‘‘through the eyes of a child’’ for
whom all is ‘‘totally new.’’ Through coaching and various
exercises, the miMakker is trained to move away from the
familiar way of looking and explore new possibilities with
other eyes—to come out of the dark and see the world in
new ways.
Internship 1 Evaluation, Maastricht, 11 September
2008
TS: You open your suitcase and say ‘‘Shall we have a
look.’’ No, go along with her, for you do not know
either what is in that suitcase. With every new
moment, you as clown are new as well; it is also a
matter of your sense of wonder! We simply think
intuitively… suitcase: something is in it. No, the
suitcase is a secret as well.
The clown does not know what she sees.
Lack of overview causes certainties on which the self
relies to disappear. But instead of holding to an inner
footing and use it as base for looking at the world, as I was
inclined to do with my suitcase according to my internship
supervisor Trudy Schambergen (at the time training
director at miMakkus), the clown is taught to find a phys-
ical footing in the world. It is called ‘‘grounding’’ in theater
terms, for instance by shifting your attention from your
head full of ideas and thoughts to the weight of your body
and the floor that ‘‘carries’’ you. The miMakkus clown Pip,
for example, owed her new sensitive self to her surrender to
the floor beneath her feet, that with her powerlessly probing
clown’s gaze she saw transform into a frighteningly thin
layer of ice. Thus she learned to forget what she as
autonomous subject knew about the floor, when she still
was simply Patricia and the floor still was a well-grounded
object outside of her (Hendriks 2012: 464).
Striving for equal contact requires not only letting go of
certainties and connecting to the other, but it also implies
that the miMakker can be touched—affected, moved, stir-
red—by the other.19 Clown’s view includes forms of
16 Unless indicated otherwise, I quote in this section from field notes
recorded during my miMakkus training, including internships (March
2008–2009), and from my observations in Saint Anna involving Fien/
Tessa Brouwer (February–March 2011).
17 The shift in this quotation of the first-person perspective from the
clown—‘I as clown’—to that of the resident—‘for me as resident’—
and further to a multiple ‘we’ perhaps occurs unknowingly, but it well
mirrors what Rauh has in mind when it comes to adopting the
disposition or stance of the resident.
18 In their recent study based on video-ethnography of elder-
clowning, Kontos et al. (2015: 13) further elaborate the reciprocal
nature of clown-resident engagement. They show in empirically rich
Footnote 18 continued
detail how residents actively contribute in both verbal and embodied
ways to so-called ‘‘relational presence’’ that emerges in ‘‘affective
relationality, reciprocal playfulness, and co-constructed imagination.’’
19 I follow here my analysis of reciprocal affect (Hendriks 2012),
based on work of Despret (2004) and Latour (2004) that I present as
critical supplement to inspiring work of Kontos (2005) on the role of
the body in dementia care. My argument is that clown and resident
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sensorial and emotional response that in case of contact
may overwhelm the miMakker with joy, but as clown she
may also be hurt by the other. ‘‘You open up and therefore
you can be moved any time.’’ Without protective layer of
language and other resources to protect herself against the
outside world—as sensitive body—the clown who is fully
present is also defenseless in the world. This also implies
that Fien, precisely when from a modern perspective she
goes too far and threatens to lose her respect for the other,
in her own eyes is at her most vulnerable and hence pre-
eminently respectful.
Clown’s view as moral attitude
The normative implications of clown’s view strongly differ
from those of respicio¯ in its modern guise (cf. Overview as
moral attitude). A respectful clown’s gaze is ruled by
proximity rather than detachment; it calls for seeking
proper rapprochement. The clown-like mode of looking
after is no longer aimed at preserving autonomy; its pri-
mary concern pertains to the individual as relational and
embodied subject. The clown represents this role in optima
forma herself, but the underlying subject view pertains to
each and every other. Translated into a proper approach of
people with dementia, the miMakker considers it to be a
matter of respect to try and go along in the ways in which
the other is present in the world and to optimally support
and secure their connection to the world.
Again, dementia comes with many threats for the
relational and embodied self: a changing bodily experi-
ence, limitations in sensorial perception and processing of
stimuli, hidden pain, uncertainty, fear, and depression.
These signs and symptoms are often reinforced by nega-
tive influences from outside, such as a monotonous living
environment designed without an eye for beauty, absence
of attention and touching, lack of sense of security, and so
on.20 They potentially undermine precisely the already
vulnerable ability of people with advanced dementia to
remain receptive for external stimuli and to continue
playing an active part in sensory conversations with the
world.
In contrast, a respectful approach based on clown’s
view is geared to helping people with dementia to retain
what is being threatened: their involvement in the world.
The miMakker does not only cultivate her own receptive
gaze, accepting the residents’ subtle presence as a gift for
the articulation of her clown’s view, but calls upon a
similar, hidden layer in how the resident looks to and
after the world that she as clown can help articulate. By
being all but grey and instead fostering the senses the
clown in her turn seeks to make a difference. She creates
specific conditions that offer residents the opportunity to
regain a sensitive body, not only to reach out and touch
but also to undergo stimuli and let themselves be tou-
ched—in short: to see anew—in order to prolong their
ability to experience their sensorial and emotional footing
in the world. Clowning in dementia care is thus tanta-
mount to creating conditions in which mutual articulation
may occur, allowing both clown and resident to tackle
indifference and see each other once again.
To underline the extent to which clown’s view as
moral approach differs from a conventional modern way
of respecting the other, the following sketch, in which all
conditions for informed consent seem to have been met, is
illustrative: Mrs. Vriends unmistakably rejects Fien’s
invitation. But instead of taking that response for granted,
Fien tries to find out if Mrs. Vriends perhaps wants
contact but is unable to realize it. If someone does not
want contact, I quoted Rauh (2013), the clown must
respect it. ‘‘But if a resident does want to, but is unable
to,’’ he continues, ‘‘we need to do our best to make
contact’’ (34). This qualification implies the transition
from a form of respicio¯ that prioritizes the autonomous
will of the other to the alternative provided by the clown
that centers on our emotional-sensorial connection with
the world.
Rather than keeping a distance in the absence of over-
view and looking for sources that—as external memory
and conscience—might provide knowledge about what the
resident might have wanted (cf. Dworkin’s moral guide-
line), for instance by seeking consent by proxy, the
miMakker leaves ‘‘the last word’’ up to the resident. The
voice of Mrs. Vriends, however, is not unrelated to the
context in which it can be articulated (cf. Pols 2005). The
clown asks for agreement, so Rauh (2013), by means of
attunement: ‘‘What does the resident want? Through opti-
mal attunement, the miMakker needs to find out’’ (34). But
attuning, he adds, ‘‘is hard because something can be dif-
ferent again in an hour’’ (34). Which is not to deny that the
clown can try again and again to ‘‘see the other, touch the
Footnote 19 continued
become equally engaged in sensitizing the other to their own bodily
ways and language, without which they would remain grey and
indifferent to each other. The image that comes to mind in the latter
case is a play in which two actors both, at the same time, are playing
the part of sleeping beauty as well as the prince (cf. Killick and Allan
2012), but never manage to meet each other. In order for both clown
and resident to become expressive and articulate in a way that matters
to the other we thus need to complement an understanding of
expressive capacities of the subject as ‘‘intrinsic’’ (Kontos et al. 2015:
13), with an understanding that values the creativity and artifice that
goes into acquiring a body, i.e. learning to become sensitized to and
affected by subtle ways of the other.
20 Cf. factors listed in the system of Dementia Care Mapping
(Brooker and Surr 2005) as undermining personhood. I have a more
specific type of factors in mind, however, that undermine the
possibility to acquire a sensitive body and to learn to see again.
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other.’’21 Respicio¯ in its receptive form also means: mod-
ifying the conditions under which people see each other in
a way that they may come out of it differently.
Saint Anna, 1 March 2011, 10.35 h
Outside a bird is chirping. Fien whistles towards the
bird and Mrs. Vriends whistles along with her. Fien
reacts thrilled. She picks up her guitar and songbook.
Mrs. Vriends says this is not allowed, at least she
believes it to be so. ‘‘Oh no? Shall I call again?,’’ Fien
asks ready to help. ‘‘Let it go,’’ Mrs. Vriends says.
Fien picks up these words in her singing. ‘‘Let us
go…,’’ she softly sings. ‘‘Miss!’’ Mrs. Vriends reacts
in a plaintive tone. ‘‘Miss… can we gohoho,’’ Fien
sings in more melancholy tone. ‘‘Just stop it,’’ Mrs.
Vriends reacts after a while. Saddened Fien with-
draws, but from some distance she asks for permis-
sion to go on through her gaze. She sings a song and
another resident joins in. ‘‘Just quit it, it is enough,’’
Mrs. Vriends maintains. As a way to end, Fien passes
the hat round. ‘‘No, just go away,’’ Mrs. Vriends says
angrily. Fien takes in the rejection and reacts
aggrieved. She magnifies her indignation by grum-
bling, stretching the scene’s ending. ‘‘Bye?!’’ she
says with emphasis, almost as a question. ‘‘Just go,’’
Mrs. Vriends responds. Fien grins and whistling she
gets her stuff out of the way. And still greets her:
‘‘Bye, bye!’’
If we were trained at miMakkus how to deal with
rejecting reactions from residents, we were told not to take
it personally. It was also said that ‘‘the clown always says
yes’’ and ‘‘accepts the gift.’’ But I never quite understood
how to do this in the case of rejection, although it certainly
did not mean that you simply had to go away. After all, the
clown ‘‘embraces the dilemma,’’ as it was called in jargon,
and turns it into a play which potentially gives rise to a
shared experience. Yet it was Tessa Brouwer who first
taught me what it means to say ‘‘yes’’ in a respectful way to
a ‘‘no’’, and thus to embrace the moral dilemma that pre-
sented itself.
Where normally we would perhaps be inclined simply to
accept the negative emotion of Mrs. Vriends—by looking
or walking away, out of respect for her wish and also
because we may have other things to worry about,—it is
precisely a matter of respect, according to Brouwer, to
‘‘stay close’’ to how Mrs. Vriends is present and to explore
her presence cautiously.
Attuning to the other is a matter of ‘‘a continuous
search’’ and of ‘‘looking: what are you doing? Which
language do you speak? Where does this person find
herself, in which emotional sphere?’’ Is this woman per-
haps apprehensive or depressive, do uneasiness and con-
fusion play a role? And it means in particular: can I go
along in (i.e. incorporate) her situation or reverse it? Can I
make her discomfort ‘‘melt’’ or should I just be with her to
optimally raise ‘‘chances of contact’’ for her?
Conclusion
Fien’s search can be read as an attempt to rescue human
contact from the burden put on it by language and cogni-
tion. She is prepared to go far, too far according to some,
namely as far as sharing a crust of bread on the floor. As a
miMakkus clown she renounces the mental and physical
distance of the subject towards the world that is commonly
seen as an achievement; in both a literal and figurative
sense, her intimate contact with the floor seems hardly
‘elevating’ to the other. But do the conventional rules of
respect apply to the situation that unfolds? How do we
know if Fien—on the floor or elsewhere—sees it right?
Whether or not the miMakker approaches the other
respectfully, according to respicio¯ in its modern guise, the
degree in which the clown supports the perspective of the
autonomous subject is decisive. This form of respect is one
of proper distance between subject and object, as well as
between subjects, which gained an established position in
psycho-geriatric care through notions such as permission,
empowerment, and free will, some of which can also be
found in the clown’s baggage.
Sometimes the world of dementia care will look orderly.
But more often it won’t, which means that one should draw
on another repertoire in order to sustain a respectful
approach of the other. The miMakker practices an alter-
native form of respicio¯ that has the relational subject as
yardstick and that taps everyone’s latent ability to stay
involved in the world—even in an advanced stage of
dementia—through a mode of sensorial conversation.
Some tentative lessons can be drawn from clown’s view
for an ethics of dementia care. Similar to conceptualiza-
tions of the human subject in care ethics (Tronto 1993;
Winance 2010), the clown’s respect pertains, on the one
hand, to people’s shared vulnerability—the latent capacity
of residents and others alike to be captured and moved by
the world and by others, and this is what their articulation
as a subject depends on. On the other hand, clown’s view
honors people’s presence—the latent capacity shared by
residents and others to make a difference to others, as a gift
that offers them an opportunity to regain their sensorial and
emotional footing in the world and become articulated as a
subject.
Such capacities may be intrinsic to people, actual en-
gagement in reciprocal relations of care is ‘‘not an innate
21 Interview miMakkus-clown instructor Titia Brasse´, Geleen, 10
April 2015.
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human capacity,’’ as Mol et al. (2010: 14) remark in
reflecting on the logic of care. Learning to ‘see again’ (the
term used in my analysis) is rather ‘‘infused with experi-
ence and expertise and depends on subtle skills’’ that
require training and fine-tuning ‘‘along the way’’ (14). As
regard questions of good care, whether a clown sees things
right cannot be judged unequivocally ‘‘from the outside’’ in
the abstract terms of rule ethics, but is a matter of ‘‘prac-
tical tinkering’’ and ‘‘attentive experimentation’’ (13) that
is situated in the ‘‘complex ambivalence’’ (14) of everyday
care situations that an ethic of care attends to. Prone to
failure rather than a recipe for success, supporting and
validating people’s engagement with the world implies a
propensity to not give up trying in the eye of uncertain
outcomes.
Looking after the other’s vulnerable and affective
presence in the world is a vital element added by the clown
to person-centered dementia care. But clown’s view cannot
be unequivocally translated into a list of guidelines for
others to implement. To what extent (aspects of) a clown’s
receptive form of respicio¯ can be carried over or inspire
other art- and care practitioners, and which conditions are
the most favorable to seeing again, is an empirical ques-
tion. Supporting people’s embodied relatedness to the
world is best understood as a process of ‘‘meticulous joint
exploration’’ (Winance 2010: 100) by all involved in the
process of care. As it touches on the essence of care, it is
our collective responsibility—and a duty of guardians of
the autonomy principle in particular—to make room in
conventional care settings to further explore, cultivate and
critically evaluate the clown’s form of respect, to the
benefit of all involved in these relations of care.
As regards to how dementia is commonly approached in
the world of care and in society, the miMakker takes up a
special position, because her effort is aimed at rendering
solidified ways of looking at and looking after people with
dementia fluid again. But every human being is different,
as is true of every encounter. In what measure disconnected
experiences of someone’s current self and critical interests
of his earlier self can be forged into a whole and in what
measure clown’s view contributes in concrete cases to
‘‘seeing whole’’ (Hughes et al. 2006: 4) can only be
assessed by combining different ways of seeing (Schermer
2003: 79)—overview, which assumes knowledge of the
earlier self of the other (e.g. by a close relative, cf. Taylor
2008), and clown’s view, which assumes a particular way
of looking to and after the other with fresh eyes.
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